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The Past, Present and Future of § 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act

Introduction
Recent efforts to reauthorize the Department of Transportation Act for the 21st
Century have spurred debate over the relative merits of what is known as § 4(f). § 4(f) is
a set of provisions contained in the 1966 Department of Transportation Act that prohibit
the Secretary of Transportation from using parklands and historic sites in transportation
projects unless stringent requirements have been met. 1 As such § 4(f) is the only
substantive federal provision protecting historic resources. Despite acknowledging the
vast success that § 4(f) has had at protecting environmental and historic resources, the
current Administration would like to reform § 4(f) in order to decrease the delays
associated with the environmental review and approval process for transportation
projects. This paper will examine: the background and passage of § 4(f); its
interpretation by the Federal Courts; the benefits and criticisms of § 4(f); and the current
proposals to reform § 4(f) including exempting the interstate highway system and
creation of a de minimis impact exception from § 4(f)’s requirements.
Background of § 4(f)
The decades of the 1950s and 1960s saw the rapid development of the interstate
highway system. As cities were connected and many miles of rural areas were paved
over people began to realize the danger this growth posed to precious environmental and
historic sites across the country. At the same time, urban renewal programs and the
redevelopment of many towns and cities sparked interest and energy in local groups
aiming to protect the historical fabric of their communities in the face of destruction and
development. As the environmental and cultural carnage mounted, so too did the

1

49 U.S.C § 303(a) (2005).
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grassroots opposition to projects undertaken with blatant disregard for their effects on the
environment and historic sites. Congress was unable to ignore the voices of
preservationists for long and by the middle of the 1960s passed several pieces of
groundbreaking legislation aimed at preserving the nation’s environmental sites and
historical heritage. 1966 saw the passage of both the National Historic Preservation Act 2
and the Department of Transportation Act.
Among the many accomplishments of the Department of Transportation Act,
some of the most notable were the provisions outlined in § 4(f). The principles
underlying § 4(f) had been enacted earlier that year in the Federal Aid-Highway Act. 3
The provisions that would be part of the 4(f) system were part of an amendment offered
by Senator Yarborough (D-TX). While Senator Yarborough’s amendment originally
included substantive protection in the form of a prohibition on the use of protected lands
unless there was no “feasible alternative to the use of such land,” the language adopted in
the act eliminated that phrase instead giving only procedural protection to parklands and
historic sites. 4
While the Federal Aid-Highway Act, with provisions derived from the
Yarborough amendment, was a step in the right direction by recognizing the potential for
conflict between the goals of transportation delivery and the protection of parklands and
historic sites as well as the importance of codifying some principles to ensure that the
park lands and historic sites are not systematically disregarded in favor of transportation
projects, more was needed to ensure substantive protection of these resources.
2
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In the Department of Transportation Act of 1966 (DOT Act) Congress
consolidated the major transportation administrations. Additionally, this legislation made
explicit the principles by which these administrations were to be guided and also placed
limits on the ability of the transportation officials to enthusiastically plough forward with
new projects for construction and expansion. 5 §2(b)(2) of the DOT Act established that:
“it is hereby declared to be the national policy that special efforts should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.” 6 Importantly, the DOT Act not only
echoed the statement in Federal Aid-Highway Act that preservation is to be national
policy but also expanded the scope of such policy to include all modes of transportation.
As opposed to the merely procedural requirements imposed on the federal
government in the National Historic Preservation Act and Federal Aid-Highway Act to
take into consideration effects on protected resources and seek to minimize the harm
done to them, § 4(f) of the DOT Act enacted a substantive federal policy to protect the
environmental and historic sites threatened by transportation projects. By coupling
already existing procedural hurdles with the substantive provisions of § 4(f), congress
imposed a ‘potent prohibition against the use of parklands and historic lands for highway
construction.” 7 Exactly how stringent the substantive provisions would be would remain
unknown until implementing regulations were passed and cases arose demanding that
courts examine the appropriateness of the Secretary of Transportation’s actions in
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fulfillment of his responsibilities. The debate surrounding the enactment of § 4(f)
suggests a broad interpretation of its provisions in order to satisfy the remedial purpose it
was intended to serve. 8 This is even more appropriate considering the time at which it
was enacted, a time when Congress was concerned with rapid bulldozing and
construction wreaking havoc on the nation’s parks and historic sites.
Despite recodification of the DOT Act in 1983, § 4(f) has remained mostly
unchanged since its original enactment. Currently § 4(f), which is codified at 49 U.S.C. §
303, reads as follows:
(a) It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort shall be made to preserve
the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and
waterfowl refuges, and historic sites.
(b) The Secretary of Transportation shall cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the
Interior, Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture, and with the States, in
developing plans and programs that includes measures to maintain or enhance the natural
beauty of lands crossed by transportation activities or facilities.
(c) The Secretary may approve a transportation program or project requiring the use of publicly
owned land of a public park, recreation areas or wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or land of an
historic site of national, State, or local significance (as determined by the Federal, State, or
local officials having jurisdiction over the park, recreation areas, refuge, or site) only if,
(1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and
(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the park,
recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge or historic site resulting from the use.

The Federal Highway Administration has acknowledged in a policy paper, which
outlines its understanding of § 4(f) practice, that, notwithstanding recodification, the
provisions continue to be called § 4(f) by those in the transportation industry. 9

Treatment of § 4(f) in the Federal Courts
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Despite laying out the principles driving the enactment of § 4(f), Congress did not
adequately explain how the Secretary of Transportation (hereinafter Secretary) could
satisfy the process required of him by § 4(f). As a result, second only to the National
Environmental Policy Act, 10 § 4(f) has been the most frequently litigated environmental
statute in the Federal Highway Program. 11 Despite the prevalence of § 4(f) litigation, the
Supreme Court has only decided one case interpreting the requirements of § 4(f). 12 In
Overton Park, the Court discussed § 4(f) and provided interpretive guidance that would
serve as the starting point for future Circuit Court cases involving § 4(f). While several
Circuits have remained faithful to the strict interpretation of § 4(f) outlined in Overton
Park, other Circuits have strayed quite far from the Supreme Court’s guidance and
instead adopted a much more flexible approach to § 4(f). The resulting split in the
Circuits regarding the requirements that § 4(f) places on the Secretary has caused the
legal status of federally funded transportation projects to be unclear and unpredictable,
often having different results depending on what state the project is to be constructed in.
The strict interpretation of the Supreme Court in Overton Park v. Volpe
The lone case concerning § 4(f) to be litigated before the Supreme Court dealt
with a proposed highway project in Tennessee. 13 The Secretary authorized the
construction of a six-lane interstate highway through Overton Park. 14 As approved, the
highway construction would necessitate the destruction of twenty-six acres of the park

10

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2005).
David E. Kunz, § 4(f): Analyzing Differing Interpretations and Examining Proposals
for Reform, working paper, available at http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/429.
12
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
13
Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 406.
14
Id.
11

6

and sever the municipal zoo from the rest of the park. 15 In seeking to defend his actions,
the Secretary asserted that § 4(f) “requires the Secretary to engage in a wide range
balancing of competing interests.” 16 This assertion was explicitly rejected by the Court,
which did not feel as though such a wide-ranging endeavor on the part of the Secretary
was intended by § 4(f). 17
In rejecting any possibility that § 4(f) necessitated a balancing approach by the
Secretary, the Court made sure that the protection of parkland was given paramount
importance as required by § 4(f). 18 The Court found the very existence of § 4(f) to be a
signal that Congress could not have intended for such commonplace factors as cost,
directness of route and community disruption to be placed on an equal footing with the
preservation of parkland. 19 After making it clear that there shall be no balancing of
competing interests when reviewing the use of protected sites under § 4(f), the Court
provided some helpful guidance as to what situations would make it appropriate for the
Secretary to authorize the use of protected lands. Only the most unusual situations may
be exempted from the “clear and specific directive” of § 4(f), which acts as a “plain and
explicit bar to the use of federal funds for construction of highways through parks.” 20 In
order for a Secretary to dismiss an alternative to the use of a protected resource as
15

Id.
Id., at 411.
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imprudent he must find that there are “truly unusual factors present in a particular case or
that the cost or community disruption resulting from alternate routes reached
extraordinary magnitudes.” 21 Additionally, an alternative that presents “unique
problems” may be dismissed as imprudent. 22
It is clear from this case that the Court interpreted § 4(f) as placing strict
requirements on the Secretary. In order to meet the aim of Congress to place the
protection of parklands as a paramount goal, § 4(f) reviews may not include a balancing
of competing interests. Moreover, the types of concerns found in most transportation
projects do not qualify an alternative as imprudent. The problems presented by an
alternative must be unique or the costs of an extraordinary magnitude before the
alternative may be rejected in favor of using the protected land.
Conflicting Interpretations of § 4(f) in the Circuit Courts
There have been many discrepancies in the ways that various Circuits have
applied the interpretive guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Overton Park when
dealing with cases involving § 4(f). This split in the Circuits is readily ascertainable by
examining the different ways that Circuits have dealt with various elements that go into
an analysis under § 4(f). The main elements that courts must deal with when faced with §
4(f) litigation are determining what constitutes a “use” of the protected resource that
triggers the requirements of § 4(f) and when the Secretary may determine that there is no
prudent and feasible alternative to the use of the protected resource.

21
22

Id., at 413.
Id.
8

Determining What Constitutes a “Use” of Protected Land
The Circuits have split as to whether there is a minimum threshold that must be
met before a “use” will be considered to trigger the requirements of § 4(f). While the
statute makes no mention of an exception for minimally intrusive or insubstantial uses,
some Circuits have nonetheless implied a threshold requirement into the term “use” in the
statute stating that anything below the threshold does not constitute a use of protected
resources for the purposes of § 4(f).
The Fifth Circuit has read § 4(f) strictly and determined that any use, regardless of
how minimal that use may be constitutes a use necessitating § 4(f) review of the
Secretary’s decision. In Louisiana Environmental Society v. Coleman, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the decision of the Secretary to approve the Louisiana Highway Department’s
proposal to build a bridge over Cross Lake to be part of I-220. 23 In eliminating the eight
alternatives he considered as imprudent, the Secretary had failed to comply with the
mandate of § 4(f) which the Fifth Circuit determined requires a “thumb on the scale
approach” providing disparate weighting against the use of parklands. 24 Any other
approach would not satisfy the desire of Congress because, it is always going to be more
attractive to go ahead and use the park because the land will be cheaper to acquire and
will not involve the displacement of residents. 25
In this case the Secretary sought to defend his decision by claiming that the
highway would not enact a substantial use of the park and should not be forbidden by §
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4(f) and that choosing an alternative would cause a delay of ten years. 26 Taking umbrage
at the Secretary’s casual dismissal of his § 4(f) requirements, Judge Clark said simply
“any park use, regardless of its degree, invokes 4f.” 27 This decision is supported by Judge
Clark’s reading of Overton Park, which he found to be “clearly to the effect that the
statute is to be read broadly to protect greenlands.” 28 Recognizing that as approved the
highway would use protected resources, Judge Clark moved on to examine whether the
reason for rejecting the alternatives satisfies the requirements of § 4(f)(2). Despite the
rather extreme length of the delay that would be caused by avoiding the use of the park,
the court opined that time delays do not rise to the level of unique problems and cannot
be used as a reason to reject an alternative as imprudent. 29
In addition to signaling that all future transportation projects using protected
resources contemplated within the states of the Fifth Circuit must be reviewed by the
Secretary according to the strict interpretation of Overton Park, La. Envtl. Soc’y also
made two contributions to the interpretation of the statute. The Fifth Circuit does not
interpret § 4(f) to include a threshold requirement of a substantial use of protected land
before its requirements are triggered, rather any use of parkland no matter how small,
must be reviewed according to § 4(f). Additionally, lengthy delays, even those lasting a
decade, are not to be considered unique and may not be used to disqualify an alternative
to use of the protected resource.
In cases dealing with federal funding of transportation it is almost always an
option to bring an appeal before the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit has jurisdiction over
26
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the activities of federal agencies. In transportation cases, this jurisdiction is concurrent
with the Circuit whose territory the transportation project will be constructed in. As a
result, a D.C. Circuit willing to adhere closely to the rationale of Overton Park would
prove to be a great friend to preservation groups bringing suit under § 4(f). Unfortunately
for those who wish to preserve protected lands from being used for transportation
projects, this has not been the case. In two cases dealing with airport expansions, the
D.C. Circuit has interpreted § 4(f) as imposing a threshold requirement for the impact on
a protected land, below which the requirements of the statute do not arise.
In Sierra Club v. Dole, Judge Bork affirmed the Secretary’s decision to allow 737
jets to operate out of Jackson Hole Airport. 30 This airport is located within Wyoming’s
Grand Teton National Park. 31 Seeking to avoid a blizzard of useless § 4(f) statements,
Judge Bork failed to find congressional intent that § 4(f) sought to create “ongoing
review of relatively minor changes in the operational character of an established
transportation facility.” 32 The requirements of § 4(f) do not arise for “relatively minor
changes” that do not “substantially impair the value of the site in terms of its prior
significance and enjoyment.” 33
While it might be true that there should be a threshold below which improvements
and changes need not be subject to § 4(f) review, it is not clear that this type of change
should necessarily fall below it. After forty-five years of propeller planes, a switch to
737 commercial jets seems as though it might be more than a mere “change in flight

30
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scheduling or operations.” 34 It is also questionable whether it is appropriate to adopt
such a hands-off approach for transportation projects that were constructed before 1966,
especially for something such as a commercial airport located in a national park. § 4(f)
very well might have intended to protect resources from even very minor changes if the
use of the resource began at an earlier time when Congress’ attitude towards preservation
was very different. Finally, the fear of a blizzard of § 4(f) statements and potential
litigation might not prove to be warranted.
More recently, the D.C. Circuit decided another airport case and affirmed its
earlier decision that minor impacts may not be considered a use. In Citizens Against
Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, the court determined that minor increases in airplane noise that
would be caused by the expansion of Toledo’s airport did not rise to the level of a
“constructive use” and would not be subject to § 4(f) review. 35
Analysis of Alternatives Under § 4(f)
In cases where it is found that the proposed transportation project will use a
protected resource, the Secretary may not approve the project unless he can reject all
alternatives as being imprudent or infeasible. 36 Unfortunately, § 4(f) does not elaborate
on what these alternatives that the Secretary will consider must consist of, nor does the
statute explain what are appropriate reasons for determining that an alternative is not
prudent.
It is well settled that in order to fairly be considered an alternative to the use of a
protected resource, the proposal being considered must not use the protected resource

34
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itself. In Druid Hills, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a decision by the Secretary to allow
the Georgia Department of Transportation to use land in Atlanta’s Druid Hills Historic
District to build its Presidential Parkway. 37 While the court ultimately remanded to the
Secretary to investigate further the mitigation of harm to the historic district that was
contemplated by the plan he approved, this case is important for its discussion of what
may be considered as an alternative to the use of protected lands as well as what type of
costs associated with a no-build alternative may conceivably be truly unique or unusual.
Before deciding to use land in the historic district, the Secretary considered five
alternative designs for the parkway. 38 After discovering that four of these so-called
alternatives actually used or impacted the park as well, the court reprimanded the
Secretary for including these as alternatives making it clear that this was unacceptable
because an alternative route that also impacts upon parks and historic sites is not an
alternative to the use of such property.” 39 Therefore, the only real alternative considered
by the Secretary was the no-build alternative. 40 In this case the cost associated with not
building the parkway at all was said to be the loss of the opportunity to build the Carter
Complex, which would include President Carter’s presidential library. 41 Despite refusing
to pass judgment on the validity of the Secretary’s claim that this would be the cost of not
building the parkway (mostly due to the court’s suspicion that there would probably be
another place to build the complex without building a highway through the historic
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district), the court provided insight into the kind of costs that they would consider to be
truly unusual or unique. 42
In Overton Park, the Supreme Court provided some guidance as to what may
constitute an imprudent alternative. Alternatives that pose truly unique or unusual
problems or result in costs of extraordinary magnitude may be rejected as imprudent.
Several Circuits have closely adhered to this interpretation of imprudent. In addition to
the Fifth Circuit, which in Louisiana Environmental Society rejected the notion that
excessive delays constitute unique problems, the Ninth Circuit has also set a lofty bar that
must be cleared before an alternative may be dismissed as imprudent. In 1984 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed Overton Park in a decision that offered additional guidance into the
requirements of § 4(f). The Secretary approved a plan to extend Interstate Route H-3 in
Hawaii using lands from two of Oahu’s most popular public parks. 43 Interpreting § 4(f)
in the context of Congress’ broader “response to growing public concern over the
preservation of our Nation’s natural beauty,” Judge Ely did not believe that the
Secretary’s decision to reject the alternatives to use of the parks satisfied the
requirements of § 4(f). 44
The Secretary considered two main alternatives, the Makai realignment and not
building the road at all. For reasons that the court does not find satisfactory, the
Secretary dismissed both alternatives as imprudent. Citing many reasons such as the
dislocation of businesses and residences, increased noise and air pollution, a cost increase
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of forty-two million dollars and safety concerns, the Secretary determined that the Makai
realignment would impose costs of extraordinary magnitude. 45 In so doing, the Secretary
amalgamated the various reasons in order to find that their sum made the alternative
imprudent. 46 While there was some debate over whether the decision by the Secretary to
add up the various costs was appropriate, the court did not find it necessary to decide on
the validity of such a tactic because even when taken together the costs did not rise to
such an extraordinary magnitude that the alternative could be rejected.47 While the court
dismissed the first three concerns with ease, the safety concern proved a bit more
troublesome. 48 The Makai alternative called for a portion of Highway H-3 to be built to
“lesser design geometric standards” which forced the court to consider the prudence of an
alternative that would increase the potential risk to human life. 49 Recognizing the
importance of safety concerns in designing transportation projects, Judge Ely asserted
that these costs warrant close scrutiny in the determination of whether they make an
alternative imprudent. 50 On the other hand, Judge Ely also noticed that such a widespread
concern as safety could easily be transformed into a “talisman” available to be cited
whenever the Secretary wishes to reject an alternative. 51 Avoiding the potential head-on
collision between these competing concerns, Judge Ely determined that in this case the
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safety concerns posed by the Makai alternative really aren’t that bad, certainly not of
extraordinary magnitude. 52
An alternative always available to the Secretary when faced with the possibility of
having to use protected lands is to decide to simply not build the road at all. Assuming
that most roads are built to satisfy the need for them, this is likely to be a rather
unattractive alternative to the Secretary. In reviewing the Secretary’s decision, Judge Ely
laid down a high standard to be met before a no-build alternative can be rejected as
imprudent. In rejecting the no-build alternative in this case, the Secretary cited
increasing congestion and commuter delays as establishing a need for the highway. 53
This was unacceptable to the majority of the Ninth Circuit; however, which took the
opportunity to assert that the costs of the no-build alternatives must be unusual or of
extraordinary magnitude just like any other alternative that the Secretary might want to
reject. 54 Relying on the fact that increased congestion and commuter delays are two of
the main reasons cited for the construction of almost every highway, the court did not feel
as though these costs qualify as unusual or of extraordinary magnitude. 55 It was the nobuild alternative that prevented unanimity in the court’s decision as Judge Kunz dissented
to warn the majority that, in his view, their approach was creating almost an implied
“presumption for the no-build alternative.” 56 Judge Kunz felt that the court was
improperly interfering with the cooperative system of transportation project design.57
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Throughout its opinion in Overton Park, the Supreme Court rejected the notion
put forward by the Secretary that competing interests in transportation projects such as
cost, community disruption and safety concerns were to be balanced against the
paramount interest in preservation enacted by § 4(f). If such concerns, which are present
in every transportation project, were to be simply placed alongside preservation concerns
then § 4(f) would have enacted no change in policy at all. 58 The notion that the Secretary
was supposed to avoid engaging in a balancing approach was closely adhered to for a
decade and a half.
In Eagle Foundation v. Dole, the Seventh Circuit departed from the trend that
other Circuits had followed since Overton Park. 59 Following twenty years of planning by
federal officials, the Secretary had approved the funding of a four-lane east-west highway
through central Illinois. 60 The proposed route for this highway ran directly through Pike
County Preservation Area, a bald eagle habitat and popular wildlife preservation area.61
The highway’s construction would also impact historic Wade Farm, an early nineteenth
century stone farmhouse that had been deemed eligible for inclusion on the National
Register of Historic Places. 62
Judge Easterbrook begins this opinion with an extended discussion of the
appropriate standard of review for courts to use in examining decisions by the Secretary.
Recognizing that it would be inappropriate for the court to substitute its opinion for that
of the Secretary on such a specialized decision, Easterbrook determines that courts must
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make a searching review of what the Secretary considered and the way in which it was
considered, but the inquiry must be replaced with deference when it comes to the wisdom
of the Secretary’s ultimate consideration. 63 The court then goes on to explain both what
the Secretary can and should consider and how that consideration should be done. The
Secretary, in fulfilling his responsibility to make prudent judgments, must take into
account ‘everything important that matters.” 64 Even the smallest problem associated
with an alternative should play some role in the determination of whether or not to reject
it. 65 This is in sharp contrast to the principle of Overton Park that only problems of
extraordinary magnitude or those that are found to be truly unique or unusual should play
a role in the decision. Not content to simply extend the breadth of things to be
considered, Judge Easterbrook goes on to reinterpret how the Secretary is allowed to
consider these things. After paying lip service to the traditional view of § 4(f) and
reminding the Secretary to give added weight to protected lands by keeping a thumb on
the scale, Judge Easterbrook proceeds to turn the § 4(f) review process on its head. In
deciding what is “prudent,” the Secretary is supposed to “balance” the competing
interests and come to a “practical” decision. 66 In conducting this balancing test the
Secretary need not confine herself to single problems of extraordinary magnitude, instead
“a cumulation of small problems may add up to a sufficient reason to use § 4(f) lands.” 67
After reinterpreting § 4(f) to allow exactly the approach that the Supreme Court
explicitly rejected in Overton Park, the Seventh Circuit goes on to attribute new meaning
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to the requirement that an alternative create truly unique factors to be imprudent. Judge
Easterbrook asserts that the Supreme Court did not really mean that a factor needed to be
unique when it said that a factor needed to be truly unique. He reaches this decision by
reasoning that a literal interpretation of Overton Park’s uniqueness requirement would be
more extreme than the statute intended. 68 Rather the Supreme Court must have simply
been emphatically asserting that the reasons for using protected lands must be good
ones. 69 In this way, § 4(f) would be able to achieve its strong presumption against turning
“chlorophyll clover leafs in the parks into concrete ones.” 70 Judge Easterbrook sought to
move away from the Overton Park principle that there must be “one whale of a problem”
with an alternative before it could be rejected in favor of using protected lands. 71 From
now on projects being constructed in the states of the Seventh Circuit may use protected
lands whenever the Secretary determines that each of the alternatives has enough small
and common drawbacks to add up to an imprudent route. 72
Eagle Foundation has served as a fork-in-the-road of § 4(f) jurisprudence. This
landmark decision has paved the way for other Circuits to move away from the strict
interpretation of Overton Park, to the delight of transportation officials and the chagrin of
preservationists and the occasional bald eagle.
Following the lead of the Seventh Circuit, other Circuits began to branch out in
their interpretation of § 4(f). Twenty years after the decision in Overton Park, the Fourth
Circuit tackled a case involving the North Carolina Department of Transportation’s
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decision to widen a highway in Hickory, North Carolina. 73 This plan, the funding of
which was approved by the Secretary, would disturb a three-block portion of the
Claremont Historic District. 74 In affirming the decision of the Secretary to approve the
plan, the Fourth Circuit strongly distanced itself from the language used in Overton Park
as well the Ninth’s Circuit’s evaluation of no-build alternatives.
Seeking to give the Secretary more latitude in her decision making, the court
announced that it would no longer require use of the “magic” terminology introduced in
Overton Park and diligently repeated for twenty years of “unique” and “extraordinary.” 75
Instead, the Secretary “need only determine that there were compelling reasons for
rejecting the proposed alternatives as not prudent.” 76 Echoing the Seventh Circuit in
Eagle Foundation, the court also determined that the compelling reasons may result from
a cumulation of problems. 77
The Fourth Circuit also broke new ground in its evaluation of no-build
alternatives. Previously, the Ninth Circuit had announced that common reasons for
planning new highways such as congestion and delays in and of themselves did not
constitute justification for rejecting a no-build alternative. This approach made it very
unlikely that a no-build alternative could be rejected in favor of using protected lands.
The Fourth Circuit adopted the opposite approach to no-build alternatives. Where it is
established that there is a demonstrated need for a highway and failing to build the
highway would result in the current traffic problem not being alleviated, the no-build

73

Hickory Neighborhood Defense League v. Skinner, 910 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id., at 161.
75
Id., at 162.
76
Id., at 163.
77
Id.
74

20

alternative may be rejected as imprudent. 78 Under this approach the no-build alternative
will likely be rejected in every instance it is considered.
Finally, a more recent trend has developed regarding alternative analysis under §
4(f). State Departments of Transportation are beginning to narrowly craft their
statements of purpose for proposed projects. By doing so, the Department may then
reject many alternatives without examining their prudence because they fail to satisfy the
very narrow purpose previously crafted. This process leads to an alternatives analysis
that usually finds no prudent and feasible alternative leading the Secretary to allow the
use of a protected resource.
An example of this strategy is the Whittier Road case. In 1995 the Alaska DOT
and FHWA proposed a project designed to replace the existing rail service to the small
town of Whittier, a popular and secluded destination tucked inside the Portage Glacier
Recreation Area. 79 The proposal that was finally chosen was the Whittier Access toll
road. This was chosen despite the existence of an alternative (improving the current rail
service) that would be safer, less expensive and less damaging to the environment. 80 The
Secretary was able to reject this alternative as imprudent because it would not satisfy the
purpose of the project, which the Alaska DOT had crafted as “to bring as many people as
possible to the Town of Whittier.” 81 By crafting the purpose of the transportation project
as such, the Alaska DOT had ensured that only one alternative would satisfy the purpose
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of the project: that which maximized the volume of traffic to the town. 82 It was clear to
all parties at the outset that the only option to do so would be a major highway. 83
However, the Ninth Circuit did not investigate the crafting of the statement of purpose. 84
If this practice continues, and Circuit courts refuse to look into the appropriateness of a
purpose statement for a proposed transportation project, then alternative analysis under §
4(f) will no longer result in meaningful protection of historic resources.
The Benefits of § 4(f)
§ 4(f) placed preservation as a paramount goal to be considered in transportation
planning. In its forty years of existence it has had tremendous success at preventing the
destruction of the nation’s historical and environmental heritage by transportation
projects. As discussed earlier, § 4(f) has prevented: the severing of Overton Park in
Tennessee; 85 the construction of a bridge over Cross Lake in Louisiana; 86 the extension
of an interstate through two of Hawaii’s most popular public parks; 87 and the disruption
of the Druid Hills Historic District in Georgia. 88 There have been myriad other
transportation projects that were prevented from using historic sites and parks by § 4(f).
Some of these § 4(f) successes include: the selection of a tunnel beneath the Baltimore
Harbor as a “prudent and feasible alternative” to building a massive suspension bridge
over Fort McHenry; leading Secretary Volpe to cancel plans to construct an elevated
riverfront highway in New Orleans that would have walled off the French Quarter from
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the Mississippi River; the preservation of the Historic Tenth Street Bridge in Great Falls,
Montana; and prevention of the demolition and replacement of the beautiful Michigan
Street Lift Bridge over Sturgeon Bay in Wisconsin with a four-lane concrete stationary
bridge. 89
In addition to simply preventing the construction of projects that might destroy
historic and environmental resources, § 4(f) has also been a success at encouraging
cooperation between transportation engineers and preservation officials. This
collaboration has resulted in better transportation designs that are conscious of the
context in which they will be built and aware of the desires and preferences of the
community. Two strong examples of this kind of effect of § 4(f) include the portion of
U.S. 93 running through the Flathead Indian Reservation in Montana and the Paris Pike
in the bluegrass region of Kentucky.
By the 1980’s the Department of Transportation realized that U.S. 93 was in need
of improvement. 90 Part of the plan the Secretary devised to deal with this problem
involved widening a fifty-six mile stretch of the road that runs through the Flathead
Indian Reservation. 91 This construction would have disrupted the habitat of many
endangered species and threatened the cultural survival of the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai tribes who have lived there for many centuries. 92 After a decade long dispute
over whether the Secretary had satisfied the requirements of § 4(f), the Montana
Department of Transportation began to work with the tribes to develop concepts for the
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highway that would be satisfactory to both sides. 93 The result of this collaboration has
been an award-winning example of community-based planning and context-sensitive
design. 94
In the late 1960’s the Kentucky Department of Transportation became interested
in widening the two-lane Paris Pike to four lanes to accommodate increased traffic. 95
The original design for the reconstruction would have destroyed many historic features in
a twelve mile stretch of the road that winds through the Bluegrass Region of Kentucky. 96
These features include historic stone walls and canopies created by mature trees. 97 By
relying on the protection of § 4(f), local citizens were successful at convincing the courts
to grant an injunction halting progress on the highway. 98 When the Kentucky DOT
returned to the plan later they decided to work with farmers, conservationists and other
concerned citizens to create a “radical new approach to the road’s design” seeking to
maximize the “preservation of the corridor’s character-defining features.” 99 This radical
new approach accomplished the goals of the Kentucky DOT as the highway was indeed
widened to four lanes; however its design was so impressive that this project has been
celebrated by such diverse bodies as the Federal Highway Administration, the American
Society of Landscape Architects, and the National Trust.100 The story of Paris Pike
shows two ways in which § 4(f) has been successful. First, § 4(f) “stopped the original,
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insensitive plan; then, its enthusiastic embrace by the Kentucky DOT led to a beautiful
project that respected the values of the community it served.” 101
Having recognized the success of the collaborative design process utilized in the
Paris Pike project, Kentucky adopted “a similar approach to its other work, using it to
protect historic places and build support for new construction.” 102 In fact many states
have had experiences similar to that of Kentucky. The long, drawn out process of dealing
with § 4(f) litigation has provided states with an incentive to incorporate the concerns of
preservationists and conservationists at the outset of the design process. This is a
valuable change because context-sensitive design combined with early and meaningful
public involvement in the design process results in a better transportation project. In
addition to resulting in a project that will steer clear of the prohibitions of § 4(f),
involving the public in the design process is also likely to facilitate consensus building
which will prevent many other kinds of delays involved in transportation project delivery
that come from local opposition. § 4(f) has led to the development of better practices by
state and local transportation officials in designing projects that incorporate the concerns
of the community as well as being conscious of the specific attributes and resources that
will be impacted by the project. This not only results in better transportation projects but
might also reduce the delay associated with environmental review and other roadblocks
that sidetrack design approval for transportation projects.
Criticisms of § 4(f)
Despite the many benefits of § 4(f) discussed above, there have been calls for
reform to § 4(f) for most of its existence. Most of these arguments in favor of revising
101
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the requirements of § 4(f) rely on three main criticisms: the § 4(f) review process creates
excessive and unnecessary delays; the rigid requirements of § 4(f) do not allow for
flexibility in the Secretary’s decision making and sometimes lead to absurd and
undesirable results; and § 4(f)’s requirements are confusing and unclear, often leading to
different results depending on what State the project is being constructed in.
The time wasting aspect of § 4(f) review is one of the most frequently cited
reasons for requesting that its requirements be changed and lies at the heart of the
Administration’s desire to include § 4(f) reform as part of the reauthorization of TEA.
The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)
views § 4(f) to be “one of the greatest causes of delay” in the existing environmental
review and approval process. 103 Furthermore, the American Road and Transportation
Builders Association (ARTBA) has testified before the House of Representatives that “if
§ 4(f) historic preservation or parkland avoidance issues come into play, the average time
period (for completing the environmental review and approval process) grows by an
additional two years, on average.” 104
Aside from the inconvenience of having to wait additional time for the completion
of new roads and the money spent to navigate the bureaucratic process, there is another
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very real cost associated with excessive delays in the transportation project approval
process. As the Executive Director of the Maryland Highway Contractors Association
Brian Holmes has put it quite simply: “Delay Kills.” 105 According to statistics kept by the
U.S. Department of Transportation, one person in the United States dies from a traffic
crash every thirteen minutes. 106
The concern that public health and safety might be at risk by unnecessary delays
in the review and approval process for transportation improvements led Chairman Young
of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure to request that the General
Accounting Office conduct a survey regarding “Stakeholders’ Views on Time to Conduct
Environmental Reviews of Highway Projects.” 107 Not surprisingly there was
disagreement between the environmental stakeholders and the transportation
improvement stakeholders as to what factors added undue time to environmental reviews.
Fifty-six percent of transportation stakeholders believed that § 4(f) adds undue time to the
review process because of its inflexibility, which makes it burdensome to comply with. 108
Of much greater concern to transportation stakeholders; however, is the lack of sufficient
staff felt in State Departments of Transportation and federal resource agencies preventing
them from handling their responsibilities in a timely manner. 109 This factor was cited by
sixty-nine percent of transportation stakeholders as adding undue time to the
environmental review process. On the other hand, environmental stakeholders believed
that the leading factors adding undue time to the process are the failure of State
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Departments of Transportation to consider environmental and historic preservation
concerns early enough in the design process and neglecting to include important
stakeholders early on in the environmental review process. 110 These factors were cited by
seventy and sixty-four percent of the environmental stakeholders, respectively. 111 It is
interesting to note that the factors cited by the environmental stakeholders as being the
omissions of State Departments of Transportation that lead to delays in the approval
process are precisely the factors which, when actually practiced by the State DOT, have
led to some of the most successful and widely praised transportation projects.
It is beyond doubt that § 4(f) review does add time to the review and approval
process of transportation projects. This should not come as a shock as the purpose behind
the legislation was not to streamline the transportation delivery process but rather to place
preservation as a paramount goal. It is with this goal in mind that the delays caused by §
4(f) review should be compared to the delays caused by other problems associated with
transportation projects and the benefits created by having the § 4(f) review. This wider
perspective will prevent an analysis of § 4(f)’s weaknesses from relying on anecdotal
evidence of excessive delays and provide a better view of where along the spectrum of
delay causing factors § 4(f) actually fits.
Despite the widespread belief that § 4(f) is a leading cause of delayed
transportation projects, data collected by the FHWA suggest otherwise. A September,
2000 FHWA survey of its state and regional offices found that the primary causes of slow
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progress were a lack of money or local disputes. 112 The FHWA study concluded that the
reasons for project delays included: (A) lack of funding – 18%; (B) local controversy –
16%; (C) low priority – 15%; (D) complex project – 13%; (E) change in scope – 8%; (F)
resource agency review – 8%; (G) endangered species act review – 7%; (H) historic
preservation reviews – 6%; (I) wetlands – 4%; (J) lawsuits – 3%; and (K) hazardous
materials – 2%. 113 Not only do these statistics show that it is misleading to portray § 4(f)
review as one of the leading causes of delayed transportation projects but they also point
to ways in which § 4(f) might even increase the speed with which transportation projects
are approved. The most successful way that State Departments of Transportation have
begun to deal with the requirements of § 4(f) has been to involve the community in the
design process and seek to achieve a context-sensitive design. According to the FHWA,
local controversy and the complexity of the project are two of the four factors most
responsible for delayed projects, combined accounting for twenty-nine percent of delays.
The benefits of improved State practices of dealing with the requirements of § 4(f) have
the added benefit of being able to minimize local controversy by involving the
community in the design process at the outset and also maximizing the extent to which
the design takes into account all relevant features of the context thereby mitigating some
of the problems caused by complexity.
The next criticism of § 4(f) is that its requirements are too rigid. As a result, the
Secretary does not have the flexibility to take into account other factors which might be
important along with the preservation goals. Sometimes this inflexibility has led to
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perverse and unpopular results. Proponents of this view assert that § 4(f) predates most
other federal environmental laws and is much more rigid.114 One example of the
inflexibility of § 4(f) occurred in Kentucky and cost the State over one million dollars to
comply with § 4(f)’s mandate. The proposed path of a road that the Kentucky DOT
sought to construct would require the demolition of an historic farmhouse. In order to
avoid the use of the farmhouse, the DOT chose an alternative path that required the
taking of a modern farmhouse, which happened to be owned by the same person who
owned the historic farmhouse. In an unexpected turn of events, the owner of the modern
farmhouse used the compensation provided by the State in exchange for moving his
farmhouse to demolish the historic farmhouse and move his modern home to the location
previously occupied by the historic farmhouse. Thus, after much administrative hassle
and public expense, the result of the entire process was the destruction of an historic
resource. 115 Despite assuring the Committee that this was but one example of many 4(f)
atrocities, Mr. Horsley neglected to share any other anecdotes. If anything, this story calls
for stronger local preservation laws more than a weakening of § 4(f) protection. The
argument that § 4(f)’s requirements are too rigid and should be changed to allow for a
more balanced approach by the Secretary has led to many proposals to change § 4(f).
These proposals are examined below, along with some of the possible drawbacks to the
changes.
The final criticism of § 4(f) is that it is confusing. This criticism is thoroughly
appropriate. Following its decision in Overton Park, the Supreme Court has not decided
another case involving § 4(f). As a result, the majority of the work done on interpreting
114
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its provisions has been left to the Circuits. As often happens, the interpretations adopted
by the federal Circuits have varied. The result of this split in the Circuits is tremendous
confusion as to how the law will be applied to individual projects. As it currently stands,
there are different standards used to analyze the decision of the Secretary depending on
what State a transportation project is to be constructed in. While this criticism of § 4(f) is
on the mark, it is silent as to how the law should be changed. The confusion created by §
4(f) does not, in and of itself, call for § 4(f) to be weakened. Instead it suggests that
Congress ought to adopt an amendment to § 4(f) clarifying its terms and provisions.
Proposals to Reform § 4(f)
For many of the reasons outlined in the previous §, the past decade has seen
persistent efforts to reform § 4(f) to increase the discretion of the Secretary of
Transportation and weaken the statute’s protection of historic resources. These efforts
have come to the forefront with the pending expiration of the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century (TEA-21). 116 In each of the past four sessions of Congress there
have been proposals introduced to reauthorize TEA, which included substantive changes
to the § 4(f) review process. Some of the main goals that these reform efforts have
sought to achieve have included: clarifying the standard for § 4(f) review to eliminate the
confusion caused by inconsistent Circuit court interpretations of Overton Park; establish
a minimum threshold impact level, below which a use of protected resources will not
trigger the requirements of § 4(f); replace the strict interpretation of the Secretary’s
responsibilities developed by the Supreme Court in Overton Park with a more flexible
balancing approach consistent with Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Eagle Foundation;
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allowing §106 consultation under the NHPA to suffice for historic properties; and
explicitly exempting the interstate highway system from treatment as a historic resource.
Thus far Congress has had to get by with piecemeal extensions of the old TEA-21
because of failures to complete and pass a reauthorization package in the past two
sessions of Congress. While the Senate’s most recent TEA-21 reauthorization legislation
has tempered some of the more radical proposals to weaken § 4(f), an approach that
might assist Congress in mustering the votes to actually pass a bill this time, it is
instructive to first review some aspects of previous legislative attempts to discover how
we have arrived at the current language being debated in Congress.
SAFETEA 2004
In February of 2004, the Senate introduced a bill that closely tracked the Bush
Administration’s proposal to reauthorize TEA-21. 117 The initial language of the bill
sought to allow §106 review under the NHPA to suffice for historic sites used in
transportation projects. While the administration included some language in the proposal
insisting that the NHPA review process used in lieu of § 4(f) would be made more
sensitive to the special concerns that inhere in using historic resources for transportation
projects it was apparent that this would weaken the protection afforded historic sites by §
4(f). Once it became clear that such a huge departure from § 4(f)’s current state would
likely impede the progress of SAFE-TEA and perhaps jeopardize its ultimate passage,
members of congress began looking for ways to find a compromise between the needs of
the transportation industry and the goals of those concerned with preserving the nation’s
environmental and cultural heritage.
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The charge for compromise was led by Senator Voinovich (R-OH). Recognizing
the need for clarification of § 4(f)’s requirements as well as the unattractiveness of
wholesale changes to its protections, Senator Voinovich settled on an amendment that
included a “de minimis” exception to § 4(f)’s requirements and also sought to encourage
earlier incorporation of “environmentally protective measures into projects.” 118 The
amendment ultimately united the support of the National Trust for Historic Preservation
(NTHP) and the AASHTO.
In addition to requiring the DOT to promulgate new and clearer regulations
describing the factors to be considered and standards to be applied by the Secretary in
making his determination of the prudence and feasibility of alternatives, an effort seeking
to eliminate the confusion created by the differing views of the various courts of appeals,
this amendment made two main changes to § 4(f). For the first time, § 4(f) would
explicitly not apply to uses small and mundane enough to fall below the threshold created
by the de minimis exception. In addition, by allowing the Secretary to consider the
measures taken by the project at avoidance, minimization, mitigation and enhancement
when determining if a use is de minimis, the amendment encourages the incorporation of
these environmentally and historically conscious design features from the beginning of
the project development process. Despite the compromise-building amendment, this bill,
like several other reauthorization efforts before it, failed to become the law of the land.
Nonetheless, the delicate way in which Senator Voinovich attempted to respond to the
persistent calls for § 4(f) reform while not neglecting the purpose for which the
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legislation was passed and the concerns of the preservation community has been
influential in more recent legislation introduced in the Senate.
TEA:LU 2005
The arrival of a new Congress has coincided with the arrival of fresh efforts to
reauthorize TEA-21. Not surprisingly, these efforts have been influenced by the
administration’s desire to streamline and update the transportation process and include
potentially misguided attempts to weaken the protection provided by § 4(f).
Disappointingly, the House’s bill, the Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy For Users, 119
which was introduced on February 9th 2005, remains faithful to previous attempts to
eliminate § 4(f) review of historic sites, replacing it with the procedural consultation
requirement of § 106 under the NHPA. While steering clear of environmental resources
and parklands, the TEA:LU seeks to create a new policy for historic sites. The pertinent
portion of this bill, section 6003 reads as follows:

(a) Title 49- Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
(d) Special Rules for Historic Sites(1) IN GENERAL- The requirements of this section are deemed to be satisfied
in any case in which the treatment of a historic site has been agreed upon in
accordance with section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (16
U.S.C. 470f) and the agreement includes a determination that the program or
project will not have an adverse effect on the historic site.
(2) LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY- This subsection does not apply in any
case in which the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation determines,
concurrent with or prior to the conclusion of section 106 consultation, that
allowing section 106 compliance to satisfy the requirements of this section
would be inconsistent with the objectives of the National Historic Preservation
Act. The Council shall make such a determination if petitioned to do so by a
section 106 consulting party, unless the Council affirmatively finds that the
views of the requesting party have been adequately considered and that section
106 compliance will adequately protect historic properties.
(3) DEFINITIONS- In this subsection, the following definitions apply:

119

Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy For Users, H.R. 3, 109th Cong. (2005).
34

(A) SECTION 106 CONSULTATION- The term `section 106
consultation' means the consultation process required under section 106
of the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f).
(B) ADVERSE EFFECT- The term `adverse effect' means altering,
directly or indirectly, any of the characteristics of a historic property
that qualify the property for inclusion in the National Register in a
manner that would diminish the integrity of the property's location,
design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, or association.'.
(b) Title 23- Section 138 of title 23, United States Code is amended-(1) by inserting `(a) Policy- ' before `It is'; and
(2) by striking `In carrying' and inserting the following:
(c) Studies- In carrying'; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (a) (as designated by paragraph (1)) the following:
(b) Special Rules for Historic Sites(1) IN GENERAL- The requirements of this section are deemed to be
satisfied in any case in which the treatment of a historic site has been
agreed upon in accordance with section 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470f) and the agreement includes a
determination that the program or project will not have an adverse
effect on the historic site.
(2) LIMITATION ON APPLICABILITY- This subsection does not
apply in any case in which the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation determines, concurrent with or prior to the conclusion of
section 106 consultation, that allowing section 106 compliance to
satisfy the requirements of this section would be inconsistent with the
objectives of the National Historic Preservation Act . The Council shall
make such a determination if petitioned to do so by a section 106
consulting party, unless the Council affirmatively finds that the views
of the requesting party have been adequately considered and that
section 106 compliance will adequately protect historic properties.
(3) DEFINITIONS- In this subsection, the following definitions apply:
(A) SECTION 106 CONSULTATION- The term `section 106
consultation' means the consultation process required under
section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (16
U.S.C. 470f).
(B) ADVERSE EFFECT- The term `adverse effect' means
altering, directly or indirectly, any of the characteristics of a
historic property that qualify the property for inclusion in the
National Register in a manner that would diminish the
integrity of the property's location, design, setting, materials,
workmanship, feeling, or association. 120

For the same reasons that led to the adoption of the Voinovich amendment in
2004, there is strong opposition to such a cavalier departure from the original goals of §
4(f). It is unlikely that such a position, remaining uninformed and unimproved by the
attempts at compromise occurring in the Senate will ultimately pass both houses.
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Interstate Exemption Provision
The other § of TEA:LU that concerns § 4(f) and protected resources is a provision
seeking to exempt the interstate system from the requirements of the § 4(f) review
process. The section of TEA:LU 2005 that would exempt the Interstate System, section
6004, reads as follows:
Section 103(c) of title 23, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
(5) EXEMPTION OF INTERSTATE SYSTEM(A) IN GENERAL- Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Interstate
System shall not be considered to be a historic site under section 303 of title 49
or section 138 of this title, regardless of whether the Interstate System or
portions of the Interstate System are listed on, or eligible for listing on, the
National Register of Historic Places.
(B) INDIVIDUAL ELEMENTS- Subject to subparagraph (C), a portion of the
Interstate System that possesses an independent feature of historic significance
(such as a historic bridge or a highly significant engineering feature) that is
listed on, or eligible for listing on, the National Register of Historic Places, shall
be considered to be a historic site under section 303 of title 49 or section 138 of
this title, as applicable.
(C) CONSTRUCTION, MAINTENANCE, RESTORATION, AND
REHABILITATION ACTIVITIES- Subparagraph (B) does not prohibit a State
from carrying out construction, maintenance, restoration, or rehabilitation
activities for a portion of the Interstate System referred to in subparagraph (B)
upon compliance with section 303 of title 49 or section 138 of this title, as
applicable, and section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966
(16 U.S.C. 470f). 121

Construction on the Dwight David Eisenhower National System of Interstate and
Defense Highways (“Interstate System”) began in 1956 following the passage of the
Federal-Aid Highway Act. 122 Over the years that followed the Interstate System has
arguably become the largest piece of infrastructure in world history. As the Interstate
System approached its fiftieth birthday in 2006, the increasing recognition of its historic
significance has “raised the possibility that the Interstate System was potentially eligible
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for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register).” 123 This
possibility was cause for concern among the transportation community as inclusion on
the National Register would trigger the protection of § 106 of the NHPA as well as § 4(f)
of the DOT Act. This would mean that even basic maintenance and improvements to any
element of the Interstate System would bring enormous burdens involved with
administrative compliance. As a result the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
worked with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) to address the
concerns of preservation and transportation officials. This collaboration resulted in the
ACHP’s adoption of the “Exemption Regarding Historic Preservation Review Process for
Effects to the Interstate Highway System.” 124
This exemption, which became effective on March 10, 2005, acknowledges the
historical importance of the Interstate System but “releases all Federal agencies from the
§ 106 requirement of having to take into account the effects of their undertakings on the
Interstate System.” 125 The exemption is not a blanket one; however, as the ACHP has
required the FHWA to designate individual elements of the Interstate System whose
historical significance demands that they be excluded from this exemption. 126
The process of individual designation of historically significant aspects of the
Interstate System is to be completed and published by June 30, 2006 and is to be
undertaken in conjunction with the ACHP, state transportation agencies, State Historic
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Preservation Offices, and members of the public. 127 The criteria used to determine the
elements that should be excluded consist of: (i) elements that are at least 50 years old,
possess national significance and meet the National Register eligibility criteria; (ii)
elements that are less than 50 years old, possess national significance, meet the National
Register eligibility criteria, and are of exceptional importance; (iii) elements that were
listed in the National Register prior to the effective date of this exemption; and (iv)
elements such as bridges, tunnels and rest areas, constructed prior to 1956 and later
incorporated into the Interstate System, that possess State or local significance and meet
the National Register eligibility criteria. 128 Satisfaction of criteria (i), (ii) or (iii) results in
automatic exclusion from the exemption while elements satisfying criteria (iv) may be
excluded at the discretion of the FHWA. 129
The Interstate System exemption from the § 106 review process has received
support from both the transportation and preservation communities. This is an excellent
example of the possibilities created by collaborative work between these sometimes
antagonistic communities. The FHWA and ACHP have fashioned a practical response to
a potential conflict that satisfies the concerns of the FHWA that necessary improvements
to the Interstate System are not held up by pointless administrative review requirements
while also recognizing and protecting the historic aspects of the Interstate System. The
ACHP does not have jurisdiction over the historic preservation regulations under § 4(f) of
the DOT Act. The proposed exemption in § 6004 of TEA:LU 2005 wisely follows the
structure of the ACHP exemption. The House’s proposal would exclude individual
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elements of the Interstate System that possess independent historic significance and are
listed on, or eligible to be listed on the National Register of Historic Places. 130 This
provision of the house proposal is a reasonable accommodation of the interests of both
the preservation and transportation communities.
SAFETEA 2005
Reflecting greater sensitivity to the conflicting interests of the transportation and
preservation communities than its counterpart in the House of Representatives, this year’s
effort by the Senate to reauthorize TEA was introduce on March 6th, 2005. The Safe,
Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005 131 has already
received favorable comments from the Environment and Public Works Committee
regarding the provisions that seek to modify § 4(f). The relevant section of SAFETEA
2005 reads as follows:
Sec. 1514. Parks, Recreation Areas, Wildlife and Waterfowl Refuges, and Historic Sites.
(a) PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS WITH DE MINIMIS IMPACTS(1) TITLE 23- Section 138 of title 23, United States Code, is amended-(A) in the first sentence, by striking `It is hereby' and inserting the following:
(a) DECLARATION OF POLICY- It is'; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
(b) DE MINIMIS IMPACTS(1) REQUIREMENTS(A) IN GENERAL- The requirements of this section
shall be considered to be satisfied with respect to an
area described in paragraph (2) or (3) if the Secretary
determines, in accordance with this subsection, that a
transportation program or project will have a de
minimis impact on the area.
(B) CRITERIA- In making any determination under
this subsection, the Secretary shall consider to be part
of a transportation program or project any avoidance,
minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures
that are required to be implemented as a condition of
approval of the transportation program or project.
(2) HISTORIC SITES- With respect to historic sites, the
Secretary may make a finding of de minimis impact only if-130

H.R. 3.
Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient Transportation Equity Act of 2005, S. 732,
109th Cong. (2005).
131

39

(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with
the consultation process required under section 106
of the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C.
470f), that-(i) the transportation program or project will
have no adverse effect on the historic site; or
(ii) there will be no historic properties
affected by the transportation program or
project;
(B) the finding of the Secretary has received written
concurrence from the applicable State historic
preservation officer or tribal historic preservation
officer (and from the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, if participating in the consultation); and
(C) the finding of the Secretary has been developed
in consultation with parties consulting as part of the
process referred to in subparagraph (A).
(3) PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, AND WILDLIFE AND
WATERFOWL REFUGES- With respect to parks, recreation
areas, and wildlife or waterfowl refuges, the Secretary may
make a finding of de minimis impact only if-(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) (including public notice and
opportunity for public review and comment), that the
transportation program or project will not adversely
affect the activities, features, and attributes of the
park, recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge
eligible for protection under this section; and
(B) the finding of the Secretary has received
concurrence from the officials with jurisdiction over
the park, recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl
refuge.'.
(2) TITLE 49- Section 303 of title 49, United States Code, is amended-(A) by striking `(c) The Secretary' and inserting the following:
(c) APPROVAL OF PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS- Subject to
subsection (d), the Secretary'; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
(d) DE MINIMIS IMPACTS(1) REQUIREMENTS(A) IN GENERAL- The requirements of this section
shall be considered to be satisfied with respect to an
area described in paragraph (2) or (3) if the Secretary
determines, in accordance with this subsection, that a
transportation program or project will have a de
minimis impact on the area.
(B) CRITERIA- In making any determination under
this subsection, the Secretary shall consider to be part
of a transportation program or project any avoidance,
minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures
that are required to be implemented as a condition of
approval of the transportation program or project.
(2) HISTORIC SITES- With respect to historic sites, the
Secretary may make a finding of de minimis impact only if-(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with
the consultation process required under section 106
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of the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C.
470f), that-(i) the transportation program or project will
have no adverse effect on the historic site; or
(ii) there will be no historic properties
affected by the transportation program or
project;
(B) the finding of the Secretary has received written
concurrence from the applicable State historic
preservation officer or tribal historic preservation
officer (and from the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, if participating in the consultation); and
(C) the finding of the Secretary has been developed
in consultation with parties consulting as part of the
process referred to in subparagraph (A).
(3) PARKS, RECREATION AREAS, AND WILDLIFE AND
WATERFOWL REFUGES- With respect to parks, recreation
areas, and wildlife or waterfowl refuges, the Secretary may
make a finding of de minimis impact only if-(A) the Secretary has determined, in accordance with
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42
U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) (including public notice and
opportunity for public review and comment), that the
transportation program or project will not adversely
affect the activities, features, and attributes of the
park, recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl refuge
eligible for protection under this section; and
(B) the finding of the Secretary has received
concurrence from the officials with jurisdiction over
the park, recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl
refuge.'.
(b) CLARIFICATION OF EXISTING STANDARDS(1) IN GENERAL- Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act , the
Secretary shall (in consultation with affected agencies and interested parties) promulgate
regulations that clarify the factors to be considered and the standards to be applied in
determining the prudence and feasibility of alternatives under section 138 of title 23 and
section 303 of title 49, United States Code.
(2) REQUIREMENTS- The regulations-(A) shall clarify the application of the legal standards to a variety of different
types of transportation programs and projects depending on the circumstances of
each case; and
(B) may include, as appropriate, examples to facilitate clear and consistent
interpretation by agency decisionmakers.
(c) IMPLEMENTATION STUDY(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary and the Transportation Research Board of the National
Academy of Sciences shall jointly conduct a study on the implementation of this section
and the amendments made by this section.
(2) COMPONENTS- In conducting the study, the Secretary and the Transportation
Research Board shall evaluate-(A) the processes developed under this section and the amendments made by
this section and the efficiencies that may result;
(B) the post-construction effectiveness of impact mitigation and avoidance
commitments adopted as part of projects conducted under this section and the
amendments made by this section; and
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(C) the quantity of projects with impacts that are considered de minimis under
this section and the amendments made by this section, including information on
the location, size, and cost of the projects.
(3) REPORT REQUIREMENT- The Secretary and the Transportation Research Board
shall prepare-(A) not earlier than the date that is 4 years after the date of enactment of this Act
, a report on the results of the study conducted under this subsection; and
(B) not later than September 30, 2009, an update on the report required under
subparagraph (A).
(4) REPORT RECIPIENTS- The Secretary and the Transportation Research Board shall(A) submit the report and update required under paragraph (3) to-(i) the appropriate committees of Congress;
(ii) the Secretary of the Interior; and
(iii) the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation; and
(B) make the report and update available to the public. 132

Much of this bill’s treatment of historic resources is similar to the
language in the Voinovich amendment to last year’s SAFETEA. In particular, this bill
seeks to carve out a de minimis exception to the requirements of § 4(f). As the
Environment and Public Works Committee realized, the language outlining the
appropriate considerations of the Secretary in determining whether a de minimis
exemption applies “builds in an incentive for project sponsors to incorporate
environmentally protective measures into a project from the beginning.” 133
SAFETEA 2005 goes further than previous bills in ways that should be
encouraging to those concerned with preservation. Subsection (b) deals with clarification
of existing standards. The language in the Environment and Public Works Committee’s
report asserts that ‘issuing regulations to clarify the criteria to be considered and the
standards to be applied in determining whether alternatives are prudent and feasible”
under § 4(f), the legal standard will remain that contained in Overton Park. 134 This
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indicates that this bill will assert the applicability of Overton Park’s interpretation for
transportation projects throughout the nation thereby undermining the efforts of some
Circuits to stray from Overton Park towards a flexible balancing approach.
The final measure of this section with an impact on § 4(f) is subsection 1514(c)’s
requirement for the completion of a study of the implementation of § 4(f) as amended.
This study may prove invaluable for numerous reasons including: providing a clear
assessment of just how these changes have worked out in practice and the compilation of
more accurate information on the impacts § 4(f) has including its benefits, costs and the
actual impact it has on delays. This will hopefully bridge the gap between the data
espoused by transportation and preservation advocates, which often seem worlds apart.
Analysis of the “De Minimis Impact” Exception
While the statutory clarification and study of the amendment’s implementation
are certainly important aspects of the Senate’s proposal to reauthorize TEA, the creation
of a de minimis exception is by far the most important change to § 4(f) advocated by this
bill. Subsection 1514(a) provides that the requirements of § 4(f) are satisfied if there is a
finding that the project will have only a de minimis impact on the area. 135 The proposal
then sets forth two different sets of criteria that must be met before a finding of de
minimis impact may occur. The impacts on a historic site may only be found to be de
minimis if: “(1) through the consultative process under § 106 of the National Historic
Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470(f)), the Secretary determines that the program or project
will have no adverse impact on the historic site or that there will be no historic properties
affected; (2) the applicable State or tribal historic preservation officer provides written
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concurrence with the Secretary’s determination; and (3) the finding is developed in
consultation with consulting parties under the § 106 process.” 136 When dealing with
parks and recreation areas, an impact may be found to satisfy the de minimis exception
only if: “(1) through review required under the National Environmental Protection Act of
1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321), the Secretary determines that the program or project will not
adversely affect the activities, features, and attributes of the park, recreation area, or
wildlife or waterfowl refuge eligible for protection under § 4(f); and (2) the official(s)
with jurisdiction over the protected resource concurs with the Secretary’s finding.” 137
The Environment and Public Works Committee has interpreted this language to be an
attempt to clarify the portions of a resource that are important to protect.138 What they
have in mind is the difference between playground equipment and parking lots. 139
“While a minor but adverse effect on the use of playground equipment should not be
considered a de minimis impact under § 4(f), encroachment on the parking lot may be
deemed de minimis, as long as the public’s ability to access and use the site is not
reduced.” 140
Subsection 1514(a) of SAFETEA 2005 also indicates that the Secretary shall
consider any avoidance, minimization, mitigation, or enhancement measures to be part of
the transportation project when determining whether the use of protected resources is de
minimis. This seems to be an additional change to § 4(f). As § 4(f) reads today there are
two separate requirements that must be met before the Secretary may authorize the use of
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a protected resource: there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land and
the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the park,
recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuges or historic site resulting from the use. 141
The Senate’s proposal creating a de minimis exception allows the Secretary to get around
the requirements stated above by determining that the use of the protected resource is
insignificant enough to not really constitute a use. It has always been the case that if the
Secretary finds that a project does not use a protected resource then the strict
requirements of § 4(f) are not triggered. However, courts have indicated that the question
of whether or not a project will use a protected resource and what mitigation measures
have been taken to minimize the impact of the use must be considered separately.
Therefore, the Secretary has usually not been allowed to consider efforts to minimize and
mitigate the harm to a protected resource as evidence that the resource is not being
“used.” This trend seems to be upset by the new proposal which would direct the
Secretary to do what the courts have forbidden him from doing: considering mitigation
measures to be evidence that a use is de minimis.
While a de minimis exception may seem to be a very reasonable accommodation
to allow transportation officials to get projects approved while not posing a great threat to
historic resources, many people in the preservation community are concerned that the
effects on protected resources may be greater than advocates of § 4(f) have indicated.
The National Trust for Historic Preservation has traditionally believed that an exemption
for minor impacts such as the de minimis exemption included in SAFETEA, will actually
be a Trojan Horse resulting in far greater usage of protected resource than Congress
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might intend. 142 The reason why such an innocuous sounding exemption as de minimis
may result in greater usage of protected resources is that it may give “the Secretary
unilateral power to invoke the exemption.” 143 After asking the individuals with
jurisdiction over the protected resource to identify specific activities, features and
attributes that qualify the site for protection, the Secretary will then be allowed to
disregard any attributes not making it onto the list and “decide unilaterally whether the
characteristics on the short list would suffer only “minor impacts.” 144 Given the
requirement that the Secretary’s decision receive written concurrence from the State
Historic Preservation Officer in the case of historic sites or the officials with jurisdiction
over the park or recreation area, it seems as though the National Trust’s concern over
unilateral power in the hands of the Secretary has been taken into account by language in
the Voinovich Amendment which has been incorporated into SAFETEA 2005. Indeed,
the National Trust has supported the Voinovich Amendment.
The concerns that preservationists have regarding the possibility for abuse of a de
minimis exemption may derive in part from the unfortunate experience they have had in
preventing the use of historic sites, parks and recreation areas by airport development and
expansion projects. While paying lip service to the notion that the doctrine of
“constructive use” applies to airport projects just as it does in highway projects, courts
have developed an alternative test for airport projects that has guaranteed that the project
will never be found to use the protected resource. When dealing with airport cases,
courts have applied a “no significant impact” test to determine whether the project uses a
142
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protected resource. 145 Defining use as having a significant impact is a deviation from the
statutory standard enacted by § 4(f). § 4(f) does not include a threshold level for use,
below which impacts and effects and on protected resources are considered acceptable.
This deviation has had drastic results as courts have considered airport projects that have
added commercial jets to a small airport located inside a national park146 or created of
one of the nation’s largest airports adjacent to a state park and wildlife refuge 147 not to
have had a significant impact on the protected resource. The final result of creating a
definition of use in airport cases that differs from the standard laid out in the statute is
that § 4(f) “has never been applied to prevent the construction of a new airport or even to
curtail the expansion of an existing airport located near an environmentally-sensitive
park.” 148 Having realized the effect that anything other than a literal definition of the term
use can have on the protection afforded by § 4(f), the concern that the preservation
community has expressed over the possible implications of a de minimis exception
become more understandable.
The creation of a de minimis exemption may actually increase the delays
associated with transportation projects. Whatever its drawbacks, the current
interpretation of a use that falls under the auspices of § 4(f) has been developed over forty
years and is relatively clear in most cases. A new standard for uses that are de minimis,
is likely to create confusion which will result in litigation to determine whether the
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Secretary is abusing the exemption. During the period in which the definition of de
minimis and its appropriate scope get hammered out in court and in many cases before
the Secretary, this proposal to change § 4(f) in order to streamline the transportation
project approval process may actually slow it down.
Conclusion
Currently, both the House and Senate proposals are being considered in their
respective committees. Debate on § 4(f) reform will likely not begin until the issues of
funding created by the reauthorization process have been settled. This process has not
been completed within the past two sessions of Congress. It is important that Congress
consider the importance of § 4(f) in protecting historic and environmental resources from
being used by transportation projects and not blindly capitulating to the Administration’s
anecdotal assertions about the delays caused by § 4(f) review. This reauthorization
process is an opportunity to improve § 4(f). The best ways to do so include a clarification
as to the correct interpretation of the statute’s requirements (perhaps by explicitly
affirming the interpretation of the Supreme Court in Overton Park) and the
encouragement (perhaps with appropriate incentive-based funding) of States to adopt the
practices of context-sensitive and community-involved design that have proven
successful in many states already. These changes would go a long way towards
eliminating the confusion and time-wasting caused by § 4(f) while ensuring that the only
substantive federal preservation law remains an effective tool.
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